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Abstract 
The fight for same-sex marriage in the United States is a contemporary topic of law 
and politics.  The Supreme Court will issue a decision on the matter by June 2013.  
Same-sex marriage, as a state’s jurisdiction, has three routes the Supreme Court can 
choose: strict scrutiny with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
strict scrutiny with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or 
rational basis with Susan Rush’s ill motives exception.  The statutes against same-
sex marriage do not survive any level of scrutiny established by the Supreme Court.  
Therefore, same-sex marriage is constitutional.    
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Introduction 
Marriage is so intertwined with humanity that it has become a part of 
everyday life in every culture.  A record of marriage exists in history from 
civilizations dating back to ancient Egypt (Tyldesley, 1994, 20).  Children are raised 
surrounded by marriage and many are taught to marry for life.  Marriage is inherent 
in culture, especially American and Western culture, and it is difficult to imagine this 
widely accepted institution inexistent in a society.   
 Yet, what is a current definition of marriage?  Some argue it is a right 
bestowed from God, consecrated in a church and only serves religious purposes.1  
However, this definition is no longer the entire definition.  The term ‘marriage’ now 
contains ‘civil marriage’ through its inclusion in numerous governmental laws and 
statutes.2  Marriage is an act recognized by law and enjoyed by a majority of people, 
religious or not.   It has become an idea of companionship with another person; as 









                                                        
1 “The judges have chosen to insult millions…from many religions and has perverted justice. God 
alone has the right to define marriage” (Hall, 2004, A21). 
2 “‘And because civil marriage licenses are obtained from the government, ending sex discrimination 
in legal or ‘civil’ marriage won't compel any change in our nation's churches, synagogues, mosques, 
and temples.’…In a related but somewhat different vein…‘religious institutions, under the direction of 
their individual leaders and religious teachings, preach what they believe is best for those people 
who share the same faith ... Government should not be a weapon used to impose religious rules or 
parochial interpretations on others,’" (Dane, 2009, n4). 
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“[Marriage] involves the couple’s commitment to each other and to 
society that they are each other’s main line of defense in the world, for 
life. It is an exclusive commitment, not in the sense a spouse doesn’t 
care for other people (children, friends, parents), but in the sense that 
only one person can be your Number One Person. Here is the “special 
someone” that you will have and hold, for better or for worse, for 
richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, until death do you part. 
Here is the one that you will come home to at night, wake up with in 
the morning, and share life’s joys, sorrows, and challenges with. Here 
is the one that you will be most intimate with physically, emotionally, 
socially, sexually—elements that are difficult to tease apart in 
practice, because they are mutually reinforcing. Nothing creates, 
signals, and sustains this kind of relationship the way marriage does” 
(Corvino, 2012, 15). 
 
However, marriage is not a privilege granted to every person, but an act that has 
historically and currently only been permitted with certain limits.3  For most of 
American history, certain States4 only allowed marriage between a white man and a 
white woman, or a black man and a black woman.  These anti-miscegenation 
standards were shattered with the case of Loving v. Virginia, (Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967)) where the United States’ Supreme Court ruled a state could not define 
a marriage based on race.  Today, the debate with marriage is its denial to 
homosexual couples.  The Federal Government and a majority of the States’ 
governments have deemed this type of marriage impermissible.    
                                                        
3 “During the 11th Century, marriage was about securing an economic or political advantage. The 
wishes of the married couple - much less their consent - were of little importance. The bride, 
particularly, was assumed to bow to her father's wishes and the marriage arrangements made on her 
behalf” (Everitt, 2012). In 1753 “The act required couples to get married in a church or chapel by a 
minister, otherwise the union was void. Couples also had to issue a formal marriage announcement, 
called banns, or obtain a licence.” (Everitt, 2012).  Another example is the States denying interracial 
marriage in the United States until the U.S. Supreme Court case of Loving v. Virginia, (Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
4 These States included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Caroline, Oklahoma, South Caroline, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and 
West Virginia until their anti-miscegenation laws were overturned by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), ("American anti-miscegenation"). 
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 This paper will argue that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples is 
unconstitutional, beginning with a history of the gay rights movement in America 
and steps taken to reach the fight for same-sex marriage.  Next, the present legal 
status of same-sex marriage is analyzed, providing a closer examination of certain 
States’ laws that deny same-sex marriage, the federal statute of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) (“Defense of Marriage,” 1996), and the current cases awaiting 
to be heard from the Supreme Court concerning same-sex marriage.   
 The paper then presents the mixed decisions created by the Supreme Court 
concerning the gay rights movement.  The cases reviewed include Baker v. Nelson 
(Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)), Bowers v. Hardwick (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186 (1986)), Romer v. Evans (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)), and 
Lawrence v. Texas (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).  Although not all of the 
cases discussed concern same-sex marriage, each offers important insight into the 
changing attitudes towards gay rights in the last fifty years. 
 The paper then addresses same-sex marriage’s constitutionality.  The thesis 
first describes what scrutiny is and defines the varying levels.  Next, it argues two 
routes to a strict scrutiny review by the Supreme Court; the first establishes the 
right to same-sex marriage as a fundamental right protected by “life, liberty, and 
property” of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The established 
fundamental right of marriage is tested as same-sex marriage under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
                                                        
5 “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;” 
(U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2) 
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(1997)).  Problems with Due Process are addressed.  If strict scrutiny through Due 
Process fails, gays are established as a suspect class under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Problems with the Equal Protection Clause 
are addressed.  After explaining the requirement of strict scrutiny, the thesis 
presents and overcomes arguments from the States as to why their anti-gay 
marriage statutes are necessary.  If the level of strict scrutiny under both Equal 
Protection and Due Process is not obtained, the statutes against same-sex marriage 
are examined under the rational basis test, to which the laws would not survive 
using Susan Rush’s ill motives exception (Rush, 2008, 704).   
 Marriage is a term not found in the U. S. Constitution. Nothing in the Bill of 
Rights says who can and cannot be married, nor is there a constitutional 
amendment that ordains marriage as a right to all, or reserved to a few.  Yet, to have 
a state or a government deny a class of people this right enjoyed by the majority of 
the population is inherently discriminatory.  The paper concludes that marriage, as 
a right, is fundamental and should be enjoyed by heterosexuals and homosexuals 
alike, protected by the United States’ Constitution.   
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History of Same-Sex Marriage 
 Same-sex marriage is a topic that is relatively contemporary in today’s 
society and has, in the last twenty years, become a widespread matter of protest and 
support (Altman, 2008).6  The gay rights movement first became widely publicized 
in the United States in 1969 with the Stonewall Riots (The Leadership Conference, 
2009), in which openly gay citizens revolted against New York City police for several 
days for the right to be openly gay in public.  The riots are considered a catalytic 
event spurring the gay rights movement (Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2012, 12).  Since 
1969, same-sex marriage has grown exponentially in support by homosexuals and 
heterosexuals.  However, the movement has concurrently grown in protest as well. 
Same-sex marriage has seen a huge shift in perceptions, political and societal, 
throughout the last decade.  In 1996, an estimated 68% of Americans were against 
same-sex marriage, the same year the Defense of Marriage Act was enacted (Stark, 
2012).  Today, perceptions have shifted.  A poll taken in 2012 reports that only 48% 
of Americans are against same-sex marriage (Stark, 2012).  Recent polls taken in 
2013 show a majority, average of 53%, supporting the legalization of the act 
("Same-sex marriage, gay," 2013).  Both President Barack Obama and Vice President 
Joe Biden have made statements supporting same-sex marriage earlier in 2012.7  In 
the November 2012 ballot vote, Maryland, Maine, and Washington were added to 
                                                        
6 Sources cited without page numbers are HTML documents found online with no page numbers 
provided. 
7 “‘At a certain point, I’ve just concluded that for me personally it is important for me to go ahead and 
affirm that I think same-sex couples should be able to get married,’ Mr. Obama said” (Calmes, 2012). 
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the States that allow same-sex marriage.8  Furthermore, in the November 2012 
election, the first openly gay United States Senator, Tammy Baldwin, was elected 
into office from the state of Wisconsin (Grinberg, 2012).  While the political and 
legal perspectives towards same-sex marriage and gay rights have shifted from 
rejection to acceptance, full equality for homosexuals to marry has yet to occur. 
 Although the United States faces same-sex marriage conflicts, there are other 
countries around the world that have both resolved and addressed the debated legal 
right.  Canada, the United States’ closest relative in regards to geography and 
political make-up, has had same-sex marriage legalized by most of its courts, 
including its highest court, since the early 2000’s (Smith, 2005, 225).  While legal in 
other countries such as Argentina, the Netherlands, Spain, South Africa, Portugal, 
Iceland, Belgium and Sweden (Alpert, 2012), it still remains a crime, sometimes 
punishable by death, in many countries in Africa, including Libya, Sudan, Egypt, 
Somalia, and Uganda (Alpert, 2012).  Many countries have homophobic laws against 
the right of same-sex marriage, including most of Australia and the majority of the 
States in the United States (Alpert, 2012).  While the countries that promote same-
sex marriage remain a minority, it proves to be an issue that demands much 
attention from legislatures worldwide.  However, same-sex marriage gains 
increasingly more support and acceptance each year (Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, 2012).   
                                                        
8 As of May 2013, Minnesota and Delaware have joined this group. 
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 Yet, in the United States the definition of marriage is decided by the States.9  
Each state is allowed to write their own laws based on the population’s ideas and 
beliefs towards same-sex marriage. Recently, the number of States that allow same-
sex marriage has increased by three since the 2012 ballot vote, with the addition of 
Maine, Maryland, and Washington to the prior list of Vermont, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Washington D.C., and Iowa ("States that 
allow," 2012).  However, in the majority of the United States, same-sex marriage 
remains illegal.  Even in federal law, The Defense of Marriage Act or DOMA, written 
in 1996, declared that States not permitting same-sex marriage do not have to 
recognize a same-sex marriage from States that allow it, and that marriage is only 
between a man and a woman ("Defense of Marriage," 1996).  
Currently, same-sex marriage is a legal, political, and cultural dilemma.  It is 
an issue that each political party takes a stance during elections and is normally 
very divisive between the Democratic and Republican parties.  The Democratic 
Party has supported the movement, while the Republican Party takes a firm stance 
against it, arguing that a marriage can only be between a man and a woman 
(McLaughlin, 2013).  The question has been addressed in past elections and will 
most likely continue to be addressed until the Supreme Court issues a ruling in the 
cases of Hollingsworth v. Perry (Hollingsworth v. Perry 558 U. S. ____ (2013)) and 
United States v. Windsor (United States v. Windsor 558 U. S. ____ (2013)).  
                                                        
9 The right to regulate marriage is given to the States by the 10th Amendment of the Constitution: 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
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Hollingsworth v. Perry addresses same-sex marriage at the state level, which 
concerns the issue of Proposition 8 in California’s 2008 election.  Opponents of 
same-sex marriage placed on the ballot a voter initiative that overturned the 
previous precedent the California Supreme Court had established in legalizing same-
sex marriage (Yoshino, 2012, 527).  The initiative stated, “Only marriage between a 
man and a woman is valid or recognized in California” (Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d, pg. 
927) and was voted into law on November 4, 2008 with 52 percent of the vote 
(Yoshino, 2012, 527).  However, homosexuals who had been married in California 
before the proposition were allowably recognized as validly married (Yoshino, 
2012, 527).  The Perry case has exhausted all levels of the lower courts, with the 
most recent decision (2012) of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that overturned 
the initiative (Perry v. Brown, 2012).  In early 2013, the Supreme Court issued a writ 
of certiorari, or a grant from the Court to hear the case, and arguments were made 
before the Court on March 26, 2013 ("Hollingsworth v. perry," 2013).  The Court is 
expected to announce a decision before the end of June 2013.   
However, until the Supreme Court issues a decision on the matter, the 
legality of same-sex marriage will continue to be regulated and decided by the States 
and their respective constitutions.  
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Present American Legal Status of Same-Sex Marriage 
Today, most American States’ governments remain opposed to same-sex 
marriage.10  The majority of the opposing States refuse to recognize the marriages 
administered by States that have legalized the institution.  Kansas argued in its 2005 
Proposed Amendment 1, “(a) Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one 
woman only. All other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of 
this state and are void. (b) No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be 
recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents of marriage” 
("National briefing," 2005).  Virginia in its 2006 Amendment stated:  
“That only a union between one man and one woman may be a 
marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions. This Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate 
the design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this 
Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize 
another union, partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned 
the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage” ("An 
amendment on," 2006), ("Gay marriage amendment," 2006). 
 
As is seen in the Virginia amendment, some States do not allow for any substitution 
to same-sex marriage, such as domestic partnerships or civil unions.  Of the fifty 
States, twenty-eight States have some form of legislation or amendment that bans 
same-sex marriage ("States that allow," 2012). These States include Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Idaho, and Florida.   
A minority of States, although not permitting same-sex marriage, will 
recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships. These States will grant homosexual 
                                                        
10 See picture on page 53 
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couples benefits of marriage while not fully recognizing the relationship as 
marriage.  Nevada is one of these States.  The Secretary of State of Nevada must 
recognize the domestic partnership, and domestic partnerships must receive the 
same rights as married couples; NRS 122A states: 
“Domestic partners have the same rights, protections and benefits, 
and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations and duties 
under law, whether derived from statutes, administrative regulations, 
court rules, government policies, common law or any other provisions 
or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses” 
("Chapter 122a"). 
 
Of the fifty States, there are nine States which permit civil unions. These States are 
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Colorado, Wisconsin, Oregon, Rhode Island, New Jersey 
and Delaware, ("States that allow," 2012). 
However, nine States and the District of Columbia have made same-sex 
marriage legal.  These States are Maine, Maryland, Vermont, New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Iowa, and Washington, ("States that allow," 
2012).11  Massachusetts was the first state to permit same-sex marriage, by judicial 
action in the case of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, (Goodridge v. Dept. of 
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)).  The case was brought by GLAD, Gay 
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, for a number of same-sex couples who were 
denied marriage licenses in the state.  The court ruled in favor of GLAD’s fight for 




                                                        
11 See page 10 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15 
“The question before us is whether, consistent with the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, 
and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the 
same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. The 
Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens. In reaching 
our conclusion we have given full deference to the arguments made by 
the Commonwealth. But it has failed to identify any constitutionally 
adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples” 
(Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), 1). 
 
After Goodridge was decided, other States followed Massachusetts, arguing that a 
denial of same-sex marriage is a denial of equality.  As Goodridge states, “Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code” 
(Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), 1).  Maryland, 
Maine, and Washington are the most recent additions to the States that allow same-
sex marriage, with the issue being approved by voters during the 2012 ballot, 
(“States that allow,” 2012).   
Although the laws of same-sex marriage have been predominantly regulated 
by the States, a Federal law exists that prohibits the act as well.  The Defense of 
Marriage Act, or DOMA passed in 1996 and has three sections.  The first section 
simply titles the legislation “the Defense of Marriage Act,” while the second section 
states: 
“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship,’’ ("Defense of Marriage," 1996).  
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This section attempts to suspend the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause12 
because the Clause may have helped spread same-sex marriages.  The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause’s main purpose is to uphold and recognize something that occurred in 
one state in any other state, such as a marriage or a divorce.13  For example, if a 
heterosexual couple was married in one state, such as Nevada, they would have to 
be considered married in any other state to which they may move. The same rule 
applies to divorce; if the same couple divorced in Nevada, and the wife moved to 
California, she would still be considered divorced in California.  This Section of 
DOMA was created with the idea that if a state decided to legalize same-sex 
marriage, the marriage would not have to be recognized by every other state to 
which a homosexual couple might move.14  Congress enacted this Section in order to 
prevent same-sex marriage spreading by a domino effect.  The effect would 
hypothetically have occurred if one state, such as Hawaii, legalized same-sex 
marriage while the rest of the States kept the act as illegal.15  Same-sex couples from 
the mainland U.S. could fly to Hawaii, be married legally, and then fly back to their 
state of residence.  Through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the other States must 
                                                        
12 “Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of every other state.” Article IV, Section 1 
13 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) The case set the precedent that the federal 
government and court decides divorce and marriage statuses in between state lines. 
14 “Section 2, entitled ‘Powers Reserved to the States,’ provides that no State shall be required to 
accord full faith and credit to a marriage license issued by another State if it relates to a relationship 
between persons of the same sex” (“The defense of,” 1996, 2) 
15 The Hawaii scenario is a very real scenario that occurred with the Hawaiian Supreme Court Case of 
Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).  Congress stated in the Background and Need for 
Legislation of DOMA “The prospect of permitting homosexual couples to ‘‘marry’’ in Hawaii threatens 
to have very real consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage laws) of 
the various States.  More specifically, if Hawaii (or some other State) recognizes same-sex 
‘‘marriages,’’ other States that do not permit homosexuals to marry would be confronted with the 
complicated issue of whether they are nonetheless obligated under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of 
the United States Constitution to give binding legal effect to such unions, (“The defense of,” 1996, 2). 
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recognize the legal Hawaiian marriage and, with the assumption that a majority of 
same-sex couples would do travel to Hawaii to marry, same-sex marriage would 
eventually have to be recognized by the rest of the United States.  This domino effect 
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause is what Congress sought to prevent with DOMA.   
 The third section of DOMA states,“…the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife” ("Defense of 
Marriage," 1996).  This section was created to show that the federal government 
does not support same-sex marriage and believes that marriage must be 
heterosexual.16   Many cases were brought against this section of DOMA, among 
them Windsor v. United States (Windsor v. United States 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012)).  In Windsor, two women were legally married in the state of New York.  The 
women were together for over forty years until one of the spouses passed away.  
Because DOMA forbids the Federal Government to recognize their marriage as valid, 
the surviving spouse had to pay a federal inheritance tax on her late spouse’s 
property, a tax that widowed heterosexual spouses do not have to incur. As Michael 
D. Steinberger argues: 
“While the estate tax laws generally allow married heterosexuals to 
transfer unlimited assets to their spouses at death without incurring 
estate tax liability, Americans in same-sex relationships are limited in 
their ability to transfer assets tax-free to their same-sex partner upon 
death” (Steinberger, 2009, Executive Summary).17   
                                                        
16 “And Section 3 defines the terms ‘marriage’ and ‘spouse,’ for purposes of federal law only, to 
reaffirm that they refer exclusively to relationships between persons of the opposite sex” (“The 
defense of,” 1996, 2). 
17 The chart below exemplifies the extra amount in estate taxes surviving spouses of same-sex 
couples are required to pay by year in comparison to surviving spouses in heterosexual couples. 
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The case was tried in a New York federal court, which ruled in favor of the surviving 
spouse.  The court argued that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional.  After moving 
to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, the New York decision was upheld on October 18, 
2012 and received a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court with arguments 
presented to the Court the week of March 25, 2013.  The case should decide the 
federal matter of same-sex marriage and the constitutionality of DOMA by June 
2013.    
Because there are two separate questions of constitutionality dealing with 
same-sex marriage in the United States, state versus federal, this paper will only 
make an argument for same-sex marriage at the state level.  These questions and 
issues lie beyond the more basic question of marriage availability to homosexuals at 
the Federal level.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Steinberger, 2009, Executive Summary).  The table is broken down by year and the bottom row 
shows the total difference in amount of taxes same-sex spouses incur compared to heterosexual 
spouses.  




73 76 550 
Average Additional 
Tax per Estate  
$3.3 million $0.2 million $1.1 million 
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Prior Precedent 
Despite being a recent topic of public controversy, the precedent with same-
sex marriage in the United States Supreme Court begins in the early 1970s and 
continues to the early 2000s.  These cases include Baker v. Nelson (Baker v. Nelson, 
409 U.S. 810 (1972)), Bowers v. Hardwick (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)), 
Romer v. Evans (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)), and Lawrence v. Texas 
(Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). While the cases do not directly deal with 
the issue of same-sex marriage, each case offers an important precedent and 
historical understanding of the progression of the movement.   
Baker v. Nelson (1972) 
Baker is one of the first cases dealing with same-sex marriage to appear in 
the U. S. court system.  After the Stonewall Riots in 1969, the gay rights movement 
gained much ground in the States.  The movement became prominent enough to 
bring its first civil rights case to the Minnesota Supreme Court, a civil rights case 
concerning a homosexual couple’s ability to marry.  In 1971, Richard Baker and 
James McConnell went to their local County District Courthouse in the state of 
Minnesota to apply for a marriage license.  The clerk Gerald Nelson denied Baker 
and McConnell the license arguing that there was no statute permitting the two to 
be legally married.  The lower trial court agreed with Nelson, stating that there was 
nothing requiring Nelson to issue the marriage license to Baker and McConnell and 
specifically instructed that there should not be a marriage license issued.  The court 
of appeals affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court did not grant a writ of 
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certiorari "for want of a substantial federal question” (Hollingsworth v. Perry 558 U. 
S. ____ (2013), 12).   
Baker argued that, although there was no law permitting he and his partner 
to be married, there was also no law denying it.  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
argued:  
“[The Minnesota statute] which governs ‘marriage,’ employs that term 
as one of common usage, meaning the state of union between persons 
of the opposite sex.  It is unrealistic to think that the original drafts-
men of our marriage statutes, which date from territorial days, would 
have used the term in any different sense. The term is of 
contemporary significance as well, for the present statute is replete 
with words of heterosexual import such as ‘husband and wife’ and 
‘bride and groom,’” (Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), 311). 
 
Baker countered that the statute is unconstitutional because:  
“The prohibition of a same-sex marriage denies petitioners a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, arguably made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and petitioners are deprived of liberty and 
property without due process and are denied the equal protection of 
the laws, both guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment” (Baker v. 
Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), 311). 
 
Using the sterilization case of Skinner v. Oklahoma (Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)) and the book of Genesis as evidence, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court argued that marriage and procreation are necessarily 
intertwined.  The Court argued that to allow marriage between a man and a man, or 
a woman and a woman would defy the laws of nature in regards to procreation and 
would not progress the true purpose of marriage, to create children.18  In regards to 
                                                        
18 “The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and 
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reI. 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942), which invalidated Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act 
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the Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Court contends that there is no invidious or 
irrational discrimination requiring the invocation of the Equal Protection Clause.19  
By presenting the argument from the anti-miscegenation historical precedent20 that 
did not allow a black and white person to marry, the Minnesota Court responded, 
“But in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction 
between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the 
fundamental difference in sex” (Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), 315).  The 
United States Supreme Court chose not to issue the writ of certiorari to Baker and 
did not create an opinion concerning gay rights until over ten years later.   
 Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 
 The Bowers case, although not directly concerning same-sex marriage, deals 
with the issue of sodomy and the progression, or perhaps regression, of gay rights.  
In 1982, Hardwick was caught participating in homosexual acts, sodomy, in the 
confines of his home and was charged with breaking a Georgia state statute 







                                                                                                                                                                     
on equal protection grounds, stated in part: ‘Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very 
existence and survival of the race.’ This historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than 
the asserted contemporary concept of marriage and societal interests for which petitioners contend” 
(Baker v. Nelson, 1972, 312). 
19 “The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause, is not 
offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or 
invidious discrimination” (Baker v. Nelson, 1972, 313). 
20 The precedent of States not allowing interracial marriage was overturned in the U.S. Supreme 
Court case of Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967).   
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“Georgia Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
‘(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or 
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another. . . .’ 
‘(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. . . .’” 
(Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 196).  
 
The district court ruled in favor of Georgia, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned.  The Court ruled,  
“Relying on our decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the court 
went on to hold that the Georgia statute violated respondent's 
fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a private and 
intimate association that is beyond the reach of state regulation by 
reason of the Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment“ (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
189). 
 
However, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Circuit Court of 
Appeals had erred. The Court stated, “The issue presented is whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, 
and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct 
illegal, and have done so for a very long time” (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), 190).  Hardwick attempted to argue that the right to practice in homosexual 
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“Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to 
discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when 
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution” 
(Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 194). 
 
The Court established that a fundamental right cannot easily be created or protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right to homosexual sodomy is not 
considered one of these rights.  However, the right for the state to create and uphold 
anti-sodomy laws in the United States was considered constitutional based on 
history and tradition; “against this background in which many States have 
criminalized sodomy and still do, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious” (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
194).  
With the decision in the Bowers case, the homosexual population thought 
their movement was pushed back; they were denied marriage and denied the ability 
to practice homosexual sex in States that ruled the act illegal.  It was not until ten 
years after Bowers that the gay rights movement began to make progress once 
again.  
Romer v. Evans (1996) 
The Romer case was the first case in which gay rights were legally advanced 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and protected by the Constitution.  The Court concluded 
that a state’s citizens could not vote a discriminatory referendum into law. 
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In 1992, the state of Colorado enacted a voter wide referendum titled 
“Amendment 2.”  The Amendment read as follows: 
“No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual 
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches 
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, 
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any 
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian 
or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall 
constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of 
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, 
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the 
Constitution shall be in all respects self executing” (Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996), 1623).  
 
After the Amendment was voted into Colorado’s state constitution, many 
homosexual citizens, including some who were government workers,21 brought suit 
against the state and Governor Romer.  The citizens argued that the Amendment is 
discriminatory and unconstitutional.22  The case reached the State Supreme Court, 
which argued the Amendment was discriminatory and should be held by strict 
scrutiny23 under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The 
Amendment “infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in 
the political process” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Syllabus).  
 When the Supreme Court passed judgment on the matter, the justices issued 
                                                        
21 “Among the plaintiffs (respondents here) were homosexual persons, some of them government 
employees” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 1624). 
22 “They alleged that enforcement of Amendment 2 would subject them to immediate and substantial 
risk of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 
1624). 
23 Strict scrutiny is the highest level of scrutiny based on a three-tiered system. The Court uses 
certain levels of scrutiny in deciding whether a statute is being inherently invidious to a class of 
people or if a fundamental right is infringed.  The level of scrutiny provided reflects the amount of 
interest the government must provide as to why it is enforced.  The lowest tier of scrutiny is rational 
basis, the next tier is heightened scrutiny, and the highest tier is strict. See page 33, et esq. for a more 
in-depth discussion of scrutiny.  
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guidelines as to what falls under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause.  The Court stated: 
“The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be 
denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the practical 
necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, 
with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons…We have 
attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if 
a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, 
we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a 
rational relation to some legitimate end” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), 1627). 
 
After establishing this guideline, the Court concluded that Colorado’s Amendment 2 
failed to even uphold the most basic of requirements under the Equal Protection 
Clause, and that the Amendment was unconstitutional.  Justice Kennedy, in the 
majority opinion, argued: 
“First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad 
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an 
exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. 
Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered 
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus 
toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to 
legitimate state interests” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 
1627). 
 
The ruling was the first issued by the United States Supreme Court that protected 
homosexuals and recognized them as a separate class subject to discrimination.  The 
case also established that a state’s voters cannot enact legislation or amendments 
that discriminate and render unequal treatment against a certain class.24  As Justice 
Kennedy concludes his opinion, “A State cannot so deem a class of persons a 
                                                        
24 Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) The United States Supreme Court ruled 
that a California statute prohibiting non-resident indigent people from residing in the state of 
California was unconstitutional conflicting with the goals of the Constitution (the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause) and the fundamental right to travel.  
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stranger to its laws” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 1629). 
 Romer is likely to influence the opinion of the case of Hollingsworth v. Perry 
argued before the Supreme Court on March 26, 2013.  Similar to Romer, the 
Hollingsworth case that concerns California was a voter-enacted law called 
Proposition 8 that denied homosexuals the right to marry.  The resemblance 
between Romer and Hollingsworth is seen in both cases concern voter-enacted laws 
that deny rights to a class of people, specifically gays.  Romer did not deal with the 
matter of marriage, but will still be influential to the Constitutional question at hand.   
 Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
 The Lawrence case is significant because it is one of the most recent Supreme 
Court decisions that concerns gay rights.  Lawrence is best known for overturning 
the Bowers decision.  Lawrence, following in the footsteps of Romer advanced the 
ideals of the gay rights movement and acknowledged the unconstitutionality of anti-
sodomy state statutes enforced against homosexuals. 
 In the state of Texas, police officers were dispatched one night to a residence 
based on a call reporting a weapons disturbance.  When entering the home of John 
Lawrence, they found him participating in activities with Tyron Garner prohibited 
by the state’s anti-sodomy laws.  The two men were arrested, held in jail overnight, 
charged and convicted.  The state statute criminalizing the acts stated that a person 
is considered an offender if he participates in “deviate sexual intercourse with 
another individual of the same sex” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 2). 
“Deviate sexual intercourse” is then defined as:  
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“(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and 
the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the 
genitals or the anus of another person with an object” (Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 2). 
 
The Texas district court and court of appeals both upheld the Texas statute based on 
the precedent of Bowers.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and established 
three questions to address within the case.  The first was whether the Texas statute 
was discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause because the law only 
criminalized sexual intimacy by same-sex couples and not heterosexuals.  The 
second question was whether adult consensual sex within the confines of the home 
violated the protected liberty and privacy guaranteed through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The final question asked whether the Bowers 
precedent should be overruled.   
 Justice Kennedy, the majority opinion’s author argued that Bowers is no 
longer a binding precedent and that, although seemingly valid at the time of the 
decision, the decision no longer holds merit.  The Court concluded that anti-sodomy 
laws, such as Texas’s, previously protected by Bowers are in fact discriminatory and 
should no longer be constitutional.  Justice Kennedy stated: 
“[The anti-sodomy laws] seek to control a personal relationship that, 
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 6). 
 
He continues to argue, “When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of 
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual 
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persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres” (Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 14) and concluded the opinion with “Bowers was not 
correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain 
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled” (Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 17). 
 In constructing the argument as to why Bowers is no longer valid, Justice 
Kennedy discussed why these anti-sodomy statutes are unconstitutional under the 
Due Process Clause.  He argues that the rights of gays have progressed and the 
group has been decided as a class of people.25  The level of scrutiny has not been 
established as how to address the class and, in Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion, she sought to make it clear that the Lawrence decision in no way legalizes 
or makes permissible gay marriage.26  However, by utilizing Romers as precedent, 
the Lawrence case made history for gay rights advocates and has continued to 
progress the movement to the question of gay marriage.  
 With the precedents of Baker, Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence, there has been 
established a history of gay rights cases and development in the United States.  The 
older cases of Baker and Bowers have presented the antiquated and historical 
                                                        
25 “We concluded that the provision was ‘born of animosity toward the class of persons affected’ and 
further that it had no rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), 14). In recognizing gays as a class of people, the Court establishes a precedent of 
future protection of the class under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
26 “That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals would similarly fail under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate 
state interest here, such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage. 
Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations—the asserted state interest in this case—other 
reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded 
group” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 7). 
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perspectives of homosexuals and gays within the country, and the more current 
cases of Romers and Lawrence have shown how much perspective has shifted in the 
last twenty years.  Concurrently, with Lawrence overturning Bowers, it is likely that 
the precedent of Baker too will be overturned.    
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Same-Sex Marriage as Guaranteed by the Constitution 
America’s legal system stems from the 224 year old Constitution.  However, 
in considering the Constitution as a “living” document, it must be open to changing 
interpretations with the changing times.27  Presently, one of the major issues 
concerning the Constitution is the problem of marriage, specifically same-sex 
marriage.  
 Marriage is an institution that is never explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution.28  There is no amendment that defines marriage nor is there an Article 
that addresses it.  The Declaration of Independence does state that there are certain 
“unalienable rights”29 of which many believe the framers used to include marriage; 
however, the Declaration of Independence is not law.   Yet, marriage is a deep-
rooted idealism that is inherent in this country.  Furthermore, marriage is no longer 
merely a religious ceremony practiced for religious benefit, or simply an act.  
                                                        
27 “We will see that the true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution, but its life, a life nurtured 
through two turbulent centuries of our own making, and a life embodying much good fortune that 
was not…I plan to celebrate the bicentennial of the Constitution as a living document, including the 
Bill of Rights and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms and human rights” 
(Marshall, T., 1987, 4). 
28 Some argue that marriage is included in the 9th Amendment stating, “The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.” However, the 9th Amendment is only argued to protect the privacy in a marriage.  Justice 
Goldberg states, “To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as 
the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many 
words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment, and to 
give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction that this fundamental right is not 
protected by the Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight 
amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth Amendment…” (Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 491) However, although the word marriage is not physically 
printed in the Constitution and its amendments, marriage has been determined a fundamental right 
as protected through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by the Supreme Court.  
29 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness.” (U.S. Declaration of Independence, Paragraph 2 (1776)). 
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Marriage provides a multitude of benefits, both monetarily, with taxes and 
insurance, and socially.  Marriage is an institution that religions, Christians,30 
Muslims,31 Buddhists,32 Hindus,33 and atheists of varying ages participate in, or 
strive to one day participate.  
There are multiple routes to constitutional protection on behalf of marriage 
for gays, some more plausible than others.  There is the denial of the fundamental 
right of marriage under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
protection of gays as a class by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Each route triggers strict scrutiny.  It is debatable as to whether both 
ways can be used simultaneously; most Supreme Court cases that have an 
intersection of Equal Protection and Due Process usually choose one route or the 
other.34  The main line of demarcation is seen as such:  
“If a law denies the right to everyone, then due process would be the 
best grounds for analysis; but if a law denies a right to some, while 
allowing it to others, the discrimination can be challenged as 
offending equal protection or the violation of the right can be objected 
to under due process” (Chemerinsky, 2006, 793-94). 
 
This thesis argues that both routes protect same-sex marriage, depending on 
                                                        
30 “For this cause a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the two 
shall become one flesh” (31 Eph. 5: New International Version).  
31 "And of His signs is this: He created for you mates from yourself that you might find rest in them, 
and He ordained between you love and mercy. Lo, therein indeed are portents for folk who 
reflect."(Quran 30:21) 
32 “The Buddhist views on marriage are very liberal: in Buddhism, marriage is regarded entirely as 
personal and individual concern, and not as a religious duty” (Sri Dhammananda Maha Thera, 2002, 
322) 
33 “The Hindu marriage is a carefully crafted, a beautifully sculpted institution and, like many 
concepts in the Hindu tradition, it is soaked in the acute and careful understanding of human nature” 
(Usgaonkar, 2005).  
34 This can be seen in the case of Lawrence v. Texas where the majority opinion determined the case 
to infringe substantive due process, but a concurring opinion written by Justice O’Connor argued for 
Equal Protection violations.   
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which course the Court takes.  However the case cannot be decided simultaneously 
with the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, or else the logic will 
commit what Susan Rush calls the “Collapsible Error.”  She argues:  
“Courts commit the Collapsible Error when they conflate the equal 
protection question (‘Are gays a suspect class?’) into the due process 
question (‘Is there an underlying fundamental right?’) by defining the 
underlying right by the group targeted by the law-gay marriage-and 
then limiting the analysis to substantive due process (‘Is there a 
fundamental right to gay marriage?’)” (Rush, 2008, 685). 
 
Rush contends that combining the Equal Protection question in the Due Process 
question is an argument that falls on itself.  She argues, “the right cannot be defined 
in a way that subsumes the equal protection issue into the substantive due process 
analysis. Stated alternatively, the right cannot be defined by the class of persons 
adversely affected by the underlying law” (Rush, 2008, 732).   
Yet, the Court has a history of committing this error, as seen in Bowers v. 
Hardwick.  Bowers made the decision that homosexual sodomy was not protected by 
the Constitution, while not addressing the constitutionality of heterosexual sodomy; 
“Committing the Collapsible Error was the primary methodological mistake of the 
Bowers Court, which held that there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
(class of persons) sodomy (underlying right)” (Rush, 2008, 732). The Court based 
the Bowers decision on Due Process claims, yet in identifying the type of sodomy as 
homosexual, the Court inherently committed an Equal Protection violation against 
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“If a state or court cannot justify the law without committing the 
Collapsible Error, then it must be unconstitutional. Moreover, if the 
only way to justify a law is by relying on the Collapsible Error, then it 
seems clear the law is ill-motivated; it is targeted at a particular group 
and the right is defined by the group. This is true even if the law only 
implicitly targets the disfavored group by defining the right to include 
only the favorable group-‘heterosexual marriage,’” (Rush, 2008, 736).  
  
In considering the statutes against same-sex marriage as unconstitutional, 
the Court must assign a level of scrutiny.  Both cases of infringing a fundamental 
right under Due Process and denying a fundamental right to a class of people under 
the Equal Protection Clause trigger strict scrutiny, the highest of the three-tiered 
system.  
A. Levels of Scrutiny  
The Supreme Court has created a process to determine the level of scrutiny a 
statute will receive.  The process includes the three tiers of scrutiny: rational basis, 
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.  Schaff defines the three levels of scrutiny 
as follows: 
“(i) Rational-basis review is the minimal standard, since it requires 
the state to have only a legitimate interest in pursuing some goal and 
the statute in question to be designed broadly to achieve that goal… 
(ii) Heightened scrutiny is an intermediary standard that requires the 
state to have an ‘important interest,’ and that the means for achieving 
it are ‘substantially related.’ (iii) The most difficult standard for the 
state to meet is required by the strict-scrutiny test.  This requires the 
state to show that it has a compelling interest that the statute pursues 
by the narrowest means possible” (Schaff, 2004, 139). 
 
Under strict scrutiny, the Court is most likely to presume a law invalid and 
the government must prove the interest behind the statute.  After the Court 
determines which level of scrutiny is utilized, the government must prove the 
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correlating level of interest (legitimate interest for rational basis, important interest 
for heightened scrutiny, and a compelling interest for strict scrutiny) and the State’s 
reason behind the statute. 
To determine the level of scrutiny, the Court must first analyze the 
constitutional question at hand and determine whether a fundamental right has 
been infringed or a classification of people could be considered suspect.  If either of 
these prongs is met with same-sex marriage, strict scrutiny must be used.  
However, if neither suspect classification nor an infringed fundamental right 
is identified, the Court resorts to rational basis.  The test is defined as: 
“The level of judicial review for determining the constitutionality of a 
federal or state statute that does not implicate either a fundamental 
right or a suspect classification under the Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. When a court concludes 
that there is no fundamental liberty interest or suspect classification 
at stake, the law is presumed to be Constitutional unless it fails the 
rational basis test.  Under the rational basis test, the courts will 
uphold a law if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose. The challenger of the constitutionality of the statute has the 
burden of proving that there is no conceivable legitimate purpose or 
that the law is not rationally related to it” ("Rational basis test," 2010).  
 
In the situation of same-sex marriage, if the Court decides that homosexuality 
is not a suspect class, nor do homosexuals have a fundamental right to marry, the 
rational basis test is used.  The test determines whether there was a “legitimate 
state interest” in the enforcement of anti-gay marriage laws.  The methodology is as 
such: if the Court establishes a suspect class (gays), then strict scrutiny is used 
against the anti-marriage statutes.  If the Court does not establish a suspect class, 
but recognizes a fundamental right has been infringed (marriage), strict scrutiny is 
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used as well.  However, if the Court believes that there is neither a suspect class nor 
an infringed fundamental right, rational basis is used (Rush, 2008, 744).  A statute 
under rational basis almost always survives, yet statutes have failed in the past 
(Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).  Yet, even under the less examined rational 
basis test, laws against same-sex marriage are still invalid. 
This thesis will argue that strict scrutiny, whether through Due Process or 
Equal Protection, is the desired outcome for same-sex marriage.  However, there are 
reasons why the Court would choose not to apply strict scrutiny in either situation.  
In that situation, the thesis will prove that the statutes against same-sex marriage 
cannot survive rational basis as well, using the Frontiero case and Susan Rush’s “ill 
motivates exception” (Rush, 2008, 704). 
B. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” 
(U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2).  Many of the country’s fundamental rights have been 
created under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  A 
fundamental right is where “The Supreme Court has held that some liberties are so 
important that they are deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’ and that generally the 
government cannot infringe upon them unless strict scrutiny is met” (Chemerinsky, 
2006, 792).  Most of the rights are not mentioned in the Constitution and many 
come from natural law or “are supported by a deeply embedded moral consensus 
that exists in society” (Chemerinsky, 2006, 794-96).  Further, many of the rights 
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deemed fundamental are protected by the term “liberty” in the Due Process Clause.  
Susan Rush states, “The growing judicial acknowledgment that some rights, 
ultimately termed ‘fundamental rights,’ are more important than others 
understandably demanded that the Court use a procedural methodology to give 
greater judicial scrutiny when evaluating the constitutionality of laws that burdened 
those especially important rights” (Rush, 2008, 695).  This “greater judicial scrutiny” 
was found in Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. (304 U.S. 144, 
(1938)) which called for “more searching judicial inquiry” in cases dealing with 
minorities, as can be seen with the suspect class argument or an “infringement of a 
fundamental right” (Chemerinsky, 2006, 795). Further, “Justice Stone's insights in 
Footnote Four in United States v. Carolene Products in 1938 expressed this need for 
heightened scrutiny when laws infringe on certain rights” (Rush, 2008, 695).  Ira 
Lupu defines fundamental rights to “include all the claims of individual rights, 
drawn from sources outside of the first eight amendments, that the Supreme Court 
has elevated to preferred status (that is, rights which the government may infringe 
only when it demonstrates extraordinary justification)” (Lupu, 1979, 983).  
An example of a “liberty” case is found in Skinner v. Oklahoma (Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, (1942)), where “Oklahoma deprives 
certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a race — the right 
to have offspring.  Oklahoma has decreed the enforcement of its law against 
petitioner, overruling his claim that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment” (Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, (1942), 536).  Skinner was a case where 
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that questioned an Oklahoma statute decreeing that criminals, after a certain 
amount of offenses, could be sterilized (Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 
U.S. 535, (1942)).  The Court ruled that, under Due Process’s “liberty” Oklahoma was 
infringing on the fundamental right to procreation, “which the Court noted is ‘one of 
the basic civil rights of man,’” (Rush, 2008, 696).  
Another example can be seen in Lawrence v. Texas.  Susan Rush argues, “it is 
clear that the [Lawrence] Court placed the interest at stake within the sphere of 
‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause… The Court held that ‘liberty’ protects 
the ‘right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life,’” (Rush, 2008, 703).  In most cases, establishing a 
fundamental right requires substantial Due Process. 
The Due Process Clause contains two types of due process: substantive due 
process and procedural due process.  Procedural due process is brought to court 
when a mistake is made in the process of a case; examples include a lack of 
notification of rights, an issue with jury instructions, or a negligent lawyer not fully 
performing his duties (Procedural due process, 2012).  Substantive due process is a 
problem with the actual topic at hand.  In the right to privacy cases, substantive due 
process is defined as “certain substantive individual rights against the States” that 
are guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, (Gertsmann, 2004).  With this form of 
due process, the Supreme Court has discretion to decide which rights can be 
adapted under the Fundamental Rights theory: 
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“where the Court adopts whatever substantive rights it thinks are so 
basic, natural and fundamental that they must be protected even 
without reliance on any particular provision of the Constitution…the 
Court is said to root these guarantees directly in the word "Liberty" in 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause” ("Substantive due 
process," 2012).  
 
In utilizing substantive due process, the Court has to decide whether the issue of 
same-sex marriage constitutes as a violation of a fundamental right or as a lesser 
liberty interest. 
Cases considered under substantive due process have a specific Supreme 
Court two-prong test that defines what can be considered a fundamental right.  The 
test is found in Washington v. Glucksberg (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997)).  Washington v. Glucksberg addresses the question of whether physician 
assisted suicide and the right to take a person’s own life is a fundamental right. The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that, “Washington's prohibition against ‘caus[ing]’ or 
‘aid[ing]’ a suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause” (Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), Syllabus).  In deciding whether there is a right to 
suicide, the Court specified a fundamental rights test.  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated 
in the majority opinion: 
“Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two 
primary features: First we have regularly observed that the Due 
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such 
that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed,’…Second, we have required in substantive-due-process 
cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest” (Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997), 720).   
 
The Court concluded that there is no right to suicide.   
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The “Glucksberg Test,”35 as it has come to be known, is now considered with a 
question of fundamental rights36 protected by the Due Process Clause.  The first 
prong of the test deals with whether the questioned right is embedded in the 
“Nation’s history and tradition” (Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997), 
721) and the second prong determines whether the right is “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty” (Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997), 721). 
However, ever since its precedent, the Glucksberg test seems to better 
determine what are not fundamental rights than what are.  As Mark Strasser argues, 
“Such a result might be thought unsurprising---if fundamental rights cannot be 
abridged unless very important state interests would otherwise be at risk, the 
recognition of many such rights would hamstring legislatures in their attempts to 
regulate everyday affairs” (Strasser, 2011, 119). Yet, the main issue with the 
Glucksberg test is that “many of the rights currently recognized as falling within the 
right to privacy [a fundamental right] could neither be described as deeply rooted in 
this nation’s history and tradition nor as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” 
(Strasser, 2011, 119). One such example is the right to contraception as protected 
by the fundamental right to privacy;37 contraception was considered illegal for many 
                                                        
35 The original test was constructed in the case of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).  However, 
today, the Glucksberg (1997) test is most commonly referred to when dealing with questions of 
fundamental rights.  
36 There have been multiple rights established as fundamental.  These include the right to vote 
(Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)), the right to privacy (Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)), and the right to travel (United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 
(1920)) (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). 
37 The fundamental right to privacy protects the right to contraception.  Furthermore, the right to 
contraception is not a right to have contraception, but a right to have a protected, private 
conversation with a doctor about procuring contraception, and the doctor’s right to prescribe such 
contraception.   
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years and eventually became fundamental and legal under the right to privacy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).  Another 
example is the right to abortion, which was criminalized for centuries until 
protected by privacy in the case of Roe v. Wade, (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).  
However, both contraception and abortion can still be regulated by the State.  In 
Mark Strasser’s article Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy, he argues that 
the Glucksberg decision is not lenient enough with current fundamental rights 
problems and that the Glucksberg test should not be considered in the decision of 
same-sex marriage (Strasser, 2011, 121).  However, although the test has strict 
guidelines that must be met, there is arguably enough evidence for the test to be 
passed.  This thesis will attempt to pass the Glucksberg test with same-sex marriage.  
The first prong of the test considers how much the right has been present in 
this “Nation’s history and tradition” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 
(1997)).  This prong is the most debated prong (Strasser, 2011, 120).  An example of 
the debate is seen with the rights to contraception and abortion, both protected by 
the right to privacy, but neither is inherent in the nation’s history or tradition.38  
However, it is debatable what extent of history should be considered: 
“The use of tradition as the sole criterion for fundamental right status 
is problematic because it virtually guarantees that the right in 
question will be denied constitutional protection, regardless of how 
strong the individual's or government's interests may be. The reason 
for this is that the tradition approach makes the existence of rights 
asserted today solely dependent on the beliefs of past generations” 
                                                        
38 The fundamental right to privacy includes the right to an abortion (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)) in that the conversation between a patient and her doctor is protected by privacy, but the 
state can place certain restrictions on whether an abortion is illegal, and, if legal, at what time of the 
pregnancy an abortion can occur.  
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(Miller, 2006, 473).  
 
However, the Supreme Court has decided that the nation’s entire history 
does not need to be considered in every case.  As stated in Lawrence v. Texas, 
“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of 
the substantive due process inquiry” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 11). In 
the past forty years, the gay rights movement has made tremendous progress.  With 
the Stonewall riots and the progression of Supreme Court cases from Baker v. 
Nelson, and Bowers v. Hardwick, towards Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas the 
rights of gays have become recognized and accepted.  Furthermore, the precedent 
set by Lawrence v. Texas made clear that the analysis of the Nation’s history and 
tradition does not require the entire Nation’s history.  Justice Kennedy argued, “In 
all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most 
relevance here.  These references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 11).  
Marriage has been established as a fundamental right without the Glucksberg 
test.  For the last half-century, there have been multiple Supreme Court cases that 
establish marriage as a fundamental right.  The first and probably most important 
case is Loving v. Virginia (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).  In 1967, over a 
hundred years after the end of the civil war and the Emancipation Proclamation, 
many States still enforced anti-miscegenation laws, or laws that prohibited 
interracial marriage between a white person and a black person.  The Lovings, an 
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interracial couple, were married in Washington D.C. and moved back to their 
Virginian hometown, a state where ant-miscegenation laws were enforced.  Suit was 
brought against them for not following the law, and the case eventually reached the 
Supreme Court.  In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that anti-
miscegenation laws were unconstitutional based on the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The decision of Loving v. Virginia, (Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967)) States that marriage is in fact a fundamental right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  Chief Justice Warren’s majority 
opinion argues “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men…Marriage 
is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival” (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 12). 
The other main case concerning the fundamental right to marriage is 
Zablocki v. Redhail (434 US 374, (1978)).  Susan Rush considers Zablocki “as the case 
that really held that marriage is a fundamental right” (Rush, 2008, 725).  The case is 
about a Wisconsin statute “which provides that members of a certain class of 
Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or elsewhere, without first 
obtaining a court order granting permission to marry” (Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US 
374, (1978), 375).  The Court directly ruled that marriage is a fundamental right 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; “When a 
statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental 
right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state 
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interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests” (Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 US 374, (1978), 388).  Rush argues, “The Zablocki Court, citing to 
Loving, emphasized that marriage is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Accordingly, the Court ‘critically’ scrutinized the law and held it 
unconstitutional” (Rush, 2008, 726).  
Other cases such as Grisworld v. Connecticut, Santosky v. Kramer, and Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey cite marriage as a fundamental right. In Griswold v. Connecticut 
(Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)) the Court argues:  
“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully 
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an 
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in 
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved 
in our prior decisions” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 
486).  
 
In Santosky v. Kramer (John Santosky v. Bernhardt S. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)) 
the Court says, “this Court’s historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in 
matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), 753).  In the case of Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)), Justice Blackmun argued:  
“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
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State” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), 851). 
 
These cases agree that marriage is a fundamental right supported by the country’s 
history and tradition far surpassing the past fifty years.  Marriage is undoubtedly 
protected. 
 Yet, because same-sex marriage has only been legalized in the last decade, 
there are conflicting precedents on same-sex marriage.  There is, however, 
precedent in the past fifty years in support for same-sex relationships.  For example, 
in Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick: 
 “[He] concluded that (1) the fact a State’s governing majority has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual 
decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, even 
when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” 
protected by due process” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 2). 
 
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy states, “These references show an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how 
to conduct their private lives” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 11).  
Consequently, all the decisions of Baker, Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence help to 
demonstrate the history, tradition, and progressive acceptance of homosexuals, and 
the rights afforded to them in the last 50 years.  The Court made a drastic shift in not 
recognizing gay rights in both Baker and Bowers, to realizing the apparent 
discrimination in Romer and correcting their error from Bowers in Lawrence.  
Therefore, with the established history and tradition of marriage in the United 
States there is, under the Lawrence precedent, substantial evidence to satisfy the 
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first prong of Glucksberg’s test for same-sex marriage.  
 The second prong establishes that the right is “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” (Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997), 721).  “Implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty” (Washington v. Glucksberg , 521 U.S. 702 (1997), 
721) is defined by Justice O’Connor in Reno v. Flores (Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 
(1993)) as “whether a governmental decision implicating a squarely protected 
liberty interest comports with substantive and procedural due process” (Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), 318).  In the case of Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur (Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 US 632 (1974)), Justice 
Stewart argues that marriage is a protected liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law” (U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2).  The Justice states, “This 
Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 US 632 
(1974), 639).  The opinion helps to show how marriage, and personal choice 
inherent in marriage, is a liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.   
By establishing marriage as a fundamental right and the ideas encompassing 
homosexuality and same-sex relationships’ progress through the last fifty years, it 
can be argued that same-sex marriage could pass the stringent Glucksberg test.  
Same-sex marriage passes the first prong with the history and tradition of marriage 
found in the United States and Supreme Court cases of Lawrence, Loving, Zablocki, 
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Griswold, Santosky, and Casey.  The Lawrence opinion is used to define ‘history’ 
limited to the last fifty years as acceptable.  The second prong is met by recognizing 
marriage as implicit to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The establishment of marriage as a fundamental right is granted 
protection under the Due Process Clause, and therefore would receive strict 
scrutiny.   
A problem with same-sex marriage through Due Process is that marriage, as 
recognized by the Court as fundamental, has always been heterosexual.  The Court 
may not consider homosexual marriage as inclusive under the historically 
recognized fundamental right to marry.  In this scenario, the Court may not use 
strict scrutiny under Due Process. 
Therefore, if the case is not granted strict scrutiny under the Due Process 
Clause, but can receive the scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
should use the Equal Protection Clause in order to avoid Susan Rush’s “Collapsible 
Error.”  Rush states: 
“the targeted group also has an equal protection right to have a court 
apply due process analysis. Otherwise, the group's members lose an 
opportunity to have a higher level of review apply, which would be 
the case if the right were already established as fundamental or would 
be placed in that category if the Court considered the question [of 
suspect classification]” (Rush, 2008, 733). 
 
 If the denial of marriage to gays is not considered a violation of a 
fundamental right, the anti-same-sex marriage laws could still be determined 
unconstitutional by establishing gays as a suspect class under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  
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C. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Equal Protection Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment states “nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 3).  The Equal Protection Clause has historically been used to 
provide equivalent treatment to every person under law and to ensure that people 
are not discriminated.  One of the first constitutional uses of the Clause can be seen 
in Strauder v. West Virginia ( Strauder v. West Virginia 100 U.S. 303 (1879)): 
“In Strauder, the Court struck down a state law that prohibited black 
men from serving on juries in criminal trials.  Significantly, the 
decision challenged the reality of a white society that condoned racial 
discrimination and preferred that the races live separately, a 
preference the Court would constitutionalize less than twenty years 
later in Plessy v. Ferguson.  Separation of the races was quite rational 
to white society at the time. Thus, Strauder is a remarkable judicial 
stand against racism at a time when rational basis review was the 
only articulated methodology” (Rush, 2008, 694). 
 
However, the idea of creating ‘suspect classes’ took much longer to create.  
Justice Stone alluded to the need for protection of minorities in Footnote Four of 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, (1938). He argues: 
“It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more 
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.... Nor 
need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review 
of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial 
minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry” (United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U.S. 144, (1938), 152).  
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Justice Stone argues that, in general, courts should believe that laws are 
constitutional, except in cases requiring a “more searching judicial inquiry.”  
Examples of these cases are when “it is a law that interferes with individual rights, 
or a law that restricts the ability of the political process to repeal undesirable 
legislation, or a law that discriminates against a ‘discrete and insular minority,’” 
(Chemerinsky, 2006, 540).  The ‘discrete and insular minority’ is the first suggestion 
of a creation of suspect classes, or a class of people discriminated against in such a 
way to require a stronger scrutiny by the Court.  As Susan Rush states, “Footnote 
Four generally is recognized as the source of the Rule; that is, that heightened 
scrutiny should apply in cases where a law infringes on a fundamental right or 
burdens a suspect class” (Rush, 2008, 695).  
 The first case that applies heightened scrutiny to a suspect class is Korematsu 
v. United States (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).  Petitioner 
Korematsu “was convicted in a federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, 
California, a ‘Military Area,’ contrary to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the 
Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, which directed that after 
May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area” 
(Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), 216).  Essentially, Korematsu was 
ordered by statute to go to a Japanese internment camp during World War II and 
refused.  He was convicted and appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Court held “all 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.... [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny” 
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(Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, (1944) 216).  Korematsu was a case 
dealing with questions of both Equal Protection and Due Process: Equal Protection 
because the case affected those of Japanese ancestry, a suspect classification, and 
Due Process through infringing the right to liberty of living where a person desires.  
However, the Court was required to issue the majority opinion on Equal Protection 
grounds “because the only reason for denying members of the group of their liberty 
was their Japanese ancestry” (Rush, 2008, 697).  This case helped establish the idea 
“that in cases where due process and equal protection intersect, courts apply 
heightened review if either a fundamental right or a suspect class is involved.  
Outside of such cases, courts generally require that legislation merely pass rational 
basis review” (Rush, 2008, 697).   
The levels of scrutiny became clearer in Kramer v. Union Free School District 
(Kamer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 US 621 (1969)).  The case concerned 
voting laws in a New York district where the district required that a person could 
not vote in elections unless “they (1) own (or lease) taxable real property within the 
district, or (2) are parents (or have custody of) children enrolled in the local public 
schools.” Chief Justice Warren defines strict scrutiny in regards to the right to vote 
as “…if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents 
of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must 
determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest” (Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), 627).   He 
continues to argue for a heightened form of scrutiny by stating:  
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“Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes which deny some 
residents the right to vote, the general presumption of 
constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional approval 
given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a ‘rational basis’ 
for the distinctions made are not applicable. The presumption of 
constitutionality and the approval given ‘rational’ classifications in 
other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the 
institutions of state government are structured so as to represent 
fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in 
effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no 
longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality” (Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), 627-28). 
 
By arguing a need for a closer scrutiny, Chief Justice Warren and the Kramer Court 
helped create the three-tiered system used today.   
  Strict scrutiny is applied to a number of cases dealing with suspect 
classifications, such as race (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)), 
religion, alienage (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, (1971)), and national origin 
(Oyama v. State of California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)).  Another class is gender, which is 
not given the full protection of strict scrutiny, but receives some form of heightened, 
intermediary scrutiny (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). If a suspect 
class is targeted, then strict scrutiny is triggered even if no fundamental right is 
violated (Rush, 2008, 699).  However, in cases where there is both an infringed 
fundamental right (Due Process Clause) and a suspect class targeted (Equal 
Protection Clause), it is up to the Court to decide which route to take.  The major 
problem in the case of same-sex marriage is that the Supreme Court has not 
established gays as a suspect class.  This paper argues that gays are a suspect class 
and require strict scrutiny in heterosexual marriage statutes.  
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The Supreme Court first established a suspect classification test for strict 
scrutiny with Korematsu v. United States (Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944)).  Korematsu established three criteria:  
“(i) the class of individuals must be the target of purposeful 
discrimination; (ii) the discrimination must violate an established 
constitutionally protected right; and (iii) a set of features to determine 
whether (ii) applies must identify the relevant features of the specific 
class in question.  For example, a defining feature of the class must be 
‘immutable’ in some sense, that is, individuals discriminated against 
because of the characteristic must not be able to change it” (Schaff, 
2004, 137). 
 
 The test was utilized and updated in 1973 with the Supreme Court case of 
Frontiero v. Richardson (411 U.S. 677 (1973)).  Frontiero:  
“concerns the right of a female member of the uniformed service to 
claim her spouse as a ‘dependent’ for the purposes of obtaining 
increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits…on an 
equal footing with male members. Under these statutes, a serviceman 
may claim his wife as a ‘dependent’ without regard to whether she is 
in fact dependent upon him for any part of her support…A 
servicewoman, on the other hand, may not claim her husband as a 
‘dependent’ under these programs unless he is in fact dependent upon 
her for over one-half of his support. Thus, the question for decision is 
whether this difference in treatment constitutes an unconstitutional 
discrimination against servicewomen” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677 (1973), 678).   
 
The Court answered the question by identifying gender as a quasi-suspect class, or a 
class protected by the intermediary heightened scrutiny.  The opinion expounded 
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“(1) Has the group suffered a history of purposeful discrimination? (2) 
Is the class the object of such deep-seated prejudice that it is often 
subjected to disabilities based on inaccurate stereotypes that do not 
truly reflect the members' abilities? (3) Is the class defined by the 
presence of an immutable trait that is beyond a class member's 
control and yet bears no relation to the individual's ability to 
contribute to society? (4) Is the group a politically powerless 
minority?” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). 
 
For the establishment of the class of LGBT citizens, the Frontiero test will be utilized 
and each prong will be appropriately addressed.  
1. Has the group suffered a history of purposeful discrimination?    
It is no secret that gay people have undergone blatant discrimination 
throughout history.  As stated in the case Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 
(Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, (2008)):   
“gay persons historically have been, and continue to be, the target of 
purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual 
orientation. For centuries, the prevailing attitude toward gay persons 
has been ‘one of strong disapproval, frequent ostracism, social and 
legal discrimination, and at times ferocious punishment,’” (Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, (2008), 432).  
 
The discrimination became legally apparent in the United States with the previously 
mentioned Supreme Court cases of Baker v. Nelson in 1972 and Bowers v. Hardwick 
in 1986.  The cases showed how the class of gays was considered unnatural and a 
type of people not afforded the same rights as every other American person.  Next, 
was the case of Romer v. Evans in 1996 of which the state of Colorado created an 
amendment affording no special rights to the gay community.  Although the 
Supreme Court eventually ruled the state amendment unconstitutional, the desire 
and purpose of the Coloradans passing this amendment was clearly discriminatory. 
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 Currently, many State and Federal laws target gays.  Today, the majority of 
States have some form of statute or constitutional amendment forbidding same-sex 




California is given the light blue color because the state is waiting for judgment on 
its status of same-sex marriage from the Supreme Court with Hollingsworth v. Perry.   
Although the gay rights movement has profoundly increased the amount of 
awareness for LGBT rights and has decreased discrimination in the last few years, 
discrimination is still present in everyday life.  Kari Balog argues:  
                                                        
39 “Defining marriage” 2013 
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“While homosexuals have made major legal breakthroughs in the last 
ten years, they continue to suffer from discrimination. Discrimination 
against homosexuals ranges from schools refusing to punish gay 
bashing, and States refusing homosexual couples the right to marry or 
adopt children.” (Balog, 2005, 2).  
 
Justice Kennedy argues in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett  (531 US 356):  
“Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or 
hostile animus alone. It may result as well from insensitivity caused 
by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive 
mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in 
some respects from ourselves” (Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001), 374-75). 
 
Until these discriminations are addressed and ratified, prejudices will continue to be 
rampant and ensue.  
2. Is the class the object of such deep-seated prejudice that it is often 
subjected to disabilities based on inaccurate stereotypes that do not 
truly reflect the members' abilities?  
Prejudice and stereotype are two terms that inherently go hand-in-hand.  
Stereotypes are considered a necessity for a prejudice of a class of people to grow 
and thrive within a society.  A Connecticut Supreme Court defined stereotype as “a 
standardized mental picture ... that represents an oversimplified opinion, prejudiced 
attitude, or uncritical judgment” (Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 
Conn. 135, (2008), 460).  Because of the growth of the gay rights movement over the 
past fifty years, stereotypes of LGBT people have flourished and have created a 
‘deep-seated’ prejudice against the class’s favor.  Various prejudices and stereotypes 
exist against homosexuals with the common goal of denying this class of people such 
inherently fundamental rights, such as the ability to marry the person one loves.   
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An example of a prejudicial gay stereotype is described by Hanna: 
“laws restricting the right to marry to ‘one man, one woman’ reflect 
and reinforce a thickly gendered conception of sex roles and what it 
means to be a ‘husband’ or a ‘wife.’ The enforcement of these roles has 
deprived women and gay men of equal social status, and it has 
‘impeded both men and women from pursuit of the very opportunities 
that would have enabled them to break away from familiar 
stereotypes.’ It has defined not only men's and women's roles as 
spouses but also their roles as citizens, workers, parents, and 
children” (Hanna, 2010, 1695).40 
 
Another example of stereotypes that the LGBT community are subjected to can be 
seen in the opinion of Judge Walker in the California Proposition 8 case of Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991-92 (N.D. Cal. 
2010)).  Judge Walker ruled that Proposition 8 was inherently invidious and 
violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution.  
He argued:  
                                                        
40 The Federal Government has enacted its own prejudiced provisions against homosexuals.  
Examples of national discrimination are seen with DOMA and DADT.  First, and most pertinently, is 
DOMA or the Defense of Marriage Act.  As discussed in an earlier chapter, DOMA federally restricts 
marriage as an act between a man and a woman, and nationally suspends the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause (Article IV, Section 1, U.S. Constitution ) in order to completely restrict marriage. The Act is 
inherently discriminatory because heterosexual couples that marry in one state are recognized in all 
other States as married.  DOMA has been in effect since 1996, over fifteen years.   
Another federal act that was discriminatory and has just recently been overturned is “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT).  The history behind DADT dates back to the 1950s when President Harry S. 
Truman signed into effect the Uniform Code of Military Justice, creating rules of discharge for any 
homosexual service member, (“Timeline,” 2010).  Continuing on to 1982, President Ronald Reagan 
stated, “homosexuality is incompatible with military service,” continuing the discharging of 
proclaimed homosexuals, bisexuals, and people who participate in homosexual acts, (“Timeline,” 
2010).  Then, in 1993 the ‘compromise’ of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” came from President Clinton’s 
administration where it was declared that gay men and women were permitted to serve but were to 
keep secret their sexuality; they were not to be asked of their sexuality nor to share it.  It was not 
until December 18, 2010 when Senate passed the vote to repeal the legislation and allow gay men 
and women freely to serve in the United States military, of which President Obama signed into law, 
(“Timeline,” 2010).  DADT and the history of the anti-gay military help to show how the country has, 
especially in the last sixty years, been predominantly discriminatory against gays.   
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“that gays and lesbians experienced discrimination based on 
unfounded stereotypes and prejudices, while finding as an evidentiary 
matter that Proposition 8 increased costs and decreased wealth for 
same-sex couples in terms of tax and health insurance burdens, while 
singling out lesbians and gays for unfavorable treatment by 
suggesting that they were incapable of forming long-term 
relationships and were not good parents” (Bamforth, 2011, 242).  
 
Justice Walker notes the stereotype the supporters of Proposition 8 and opponents 
of same-sex marriage have is:  
“the campaign in favor of Proposition 8 had relied on fears that 
children exposed to the concept of same-sex marriage might somehow 
‘become’ gay or lesbian, entailing inaccurate insinuations about the 
possibility of ‘conversion’ from heterosexuality and implicit fears that 
parents should dread having a non-heterosexual child, propositions 
which again reduced to stereotypes concerning the ‘inferiority’ of 
same-sex relationships.”  (Bamforth, 2011, 245). 
 
In Judge Walker’s conclusion of the case, he states that: 
“as a matter of law that what remained of the case for Proposition 8 
was the notion that same-sex couples simply are not as good as 
opposite-sex couples. Whether that belief is based on moral 
disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or 
simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is 
inherently better than a relationship between two men or two 
women, this belief is not a proper basis on which to legislate” 
(Bamforth, 2011, 244). 
 
The prejudices and stereotypes held against gays are apparent and 
seemingly irrational.  Yet, they are prejudices still upheld and fought for 
against homosexuals in court cases to this day.  These prejudices and 
stereotypes are devastatingly invidious and will most probably not be upheld 
under Constitutional scrutiny.   
3. Is the class defined by the presence of an immutable trait that is 
beyond a class member's control and yet bears no relation to the 
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individual's ability to contribute to society? 
The set of features required by the Court to determine a suspect class must 
be immutable or “a trait that is ‘determined solely by the accident of birth’ and is 
‘not capable of or susceptible to change.’ This definition of immutability does not 
include ‘ethnic or sociocultural’ characteristics ‘such as citizenship or alienage’ or 
‘poverty,’” (Balog, 2005, 554).  Some previously determined immutable traits 
include race and gender:  
“since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special 
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex 
would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system,’” (Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), 686).   
 
The question of immutability in the case of same-sex marriage is whether being ‘gay’ 
is an immutable trait that cannot be changed or altered.  However, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that immutability does not imply biology, that instead the Court 
recognizes an immutable trait as “immutable if changing it would involve great 
difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic change of 
identity” (Schaff, 2004, 138).  Furthermore, as stated in Frontiero in addressing the 
immutability of gender, “what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as 
intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, 
is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), 686).  The same 
applies in the case of homosexuality because a person’s private sexuality will not 
negatively harm the way the person functions in his/her career, social relations, 
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ability to abide by laws, or add to society.  As stated in the Connecticut Supreme 
Court case of Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, “The characteristic that 
defines the members of this group--attraction to persons of the same sex--bears no 
logical relationship to their ability to perform in society, either in familial relations 
or otherwise as productive citizens” (Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 
Conn. 135, (2008), 426). 
When it comes to homosexuality, there are conclusions drawn as to whether 
being gay is a choice or inherently immutable.  As Kari Balog argues: 
“While members of the American Psychiatric Association are unable 
to agree on one cause for sexual orientation, they do agree that 
‘human beings can not choose to be either gay or straight . . . Sexual 
orientation [is not] a conscious choice that can be voluntarily 
changed.’ The antiquated belief that homosexuality is an illness which 
can be spread has generally diminished and doctors and scientists 
widely agree that homosexual orientation can not be spread. This 
drastic change in thought shows a general acceptance of 
homosexuality as a trait which is at least mostly predetermined and 
completely beyond the control of the affected person. The early 
determination of sexual orientation and its inability to change, shows 
that sexual orientation is as immutable as race or gender. Thus, 
homosexuals should be classified as a suspect classification for equal 
protection purposes” (Balog, 2005, 562). 
 
Balog analyzes only one aspect here, the psychological aspect, but continues on in 
her argument to present evidence from biology and genetics that homosexuality is 
not a choice and has increasingly proven scientifically to be immutable.   
4. Is the group a politically powerless minority? 
The question of the political powerlessness of gays seems to be the most 
challenging prong to meet.  Although gays have had a history of political 
powerlessness, such as exposed in Romer v. Evans, the amount of support for the 
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movement has grown enormously over the last decade.  In Justice Scalia’s dissent of 
Romer v. Evans he argues, “it is also nothing short of preposterous to call ‘politically 
unpopular’ a group which enjoys enormous influence in American media and 
politics” (Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 652).  
In response to Justice Scalia’s opinion, Susan Rush argues “Significantly, the 
struggle for equal protection is not about political popularity; it is about political 
power” (Rush, 2008, 713).  She contends: 
“It bears emphasizing that how much a group is feared or hated 
generally is related to how much or how little political power they 
have. But political power is different from political popularity. 
Political power is about gaining equal citizenship on an enduring 
basis. Sometimes people, perhaps as a matter of principle, use their 
political power to support even very politically unpopular groups that 
are the target of prejudice or hostility… Progress toward equality for 
politically powerless groups necessarily relies on the goodwill, 
understanding, and ultimately the integrity of the politically powerful. 
Sometimes this will manifest itself in the ordinary democratic process 
(majority wins)… Other times it must manifest itself in decisions by 
politically powerful figures-like judges-who are called upon in the 
democratic process to protect ‘constitutional values in our scheme of 
government even more fundamental than perfected pluralism-most 
notably, those that bar prejudice against ‘discrete and insular 
minorities,’’” (Rush, 2008, 713). 
 
Rush believes the argument that gays are politically powerful “allows the forest to 
get lost among the trees” (Rush, 2008, 722).  She continues her argument by citing 
the legislative discrimination that gays have endured:  
“Indeed, one logically could conclude that passage of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), defining marriage as between a man and a 
woman, and the efforts of many States to pass laws limiting marriage 
to a man and a woman, are the ultimate evidence of just how 
politically powerless gays are throughout the country” (Rush, 2008, 
722-23). 
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Further, Rush concludes, “The widespread political movements across the country 
to limit marriage to a man and a woman belie any suggestion that gays are a 
politically powerful group” (Rush, 2008, 742). 
The conclusion that gays are not politically powerless because of the amount 
of public support the movement has is intrinsically weak; as Rush exemplifies, if the 
group were politically powerful, the anti-same-sex marriage laws would not be in 
place.   
Furthermore, Kenji Yoshino (Yoshino, 2010) argues that the LGBT 
community can meet the requirements of the prong based on previous Supreme 
Court precedent.  His first argument states, “In the 1973 case of Frontiero v. 
Richardson, a plurality of the Court observed that women could be deemed 
politically powerless despite their numerosity because they were ‘vastly 
underrepresented’ in the ‘Nation's decisionmaking councils,’” (Yoshino, 2010, 
1542).   However, Yoshino argues that this is a vague standard as many other 
classes, such as people with disabilities, which have received substantial media and 
legislative attention, have failed to meet this prong (Yoshino, 2010, 1542). 
Yoshino in substitution argues for a formula of factors to determine political 
powerlessness.  He wants these factors to be: 
 
“(1) the group's income and wealth; (2) its health and longevity; (3) 
its freedom from public and private violence; (4) its ability to exercise 
its political rights; (5) its education level; (6) its social position; and 
(7) the acceptability of prejudice against the group” (Yoshino, 2010, 
1543).41 
                                                        
41 He has constructed this list of requirements based on:  
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Based on the previous prongs on the Frontiero test alone, the LGBT class has 
already met numbers 3, 6, and 7, in relation to the amount of discrimination, 
prejudice, and stereotypes waged against homosexuals over the years.  
Yoshino argues the rest of the factors are capable of being met: 
“Despite the myth of gay affluence, gays face significant wage 
discrimination. With respect to health and longevity, studies show 
that the suicide rate for gay youth is as high as seven times that of 
their straight peers. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
recent years have generally seen a rise in reported hate crimes against 
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation” (Yoshino, 2010, 1543). 
 
Yet, although Yoshino’s argument is promising, there is a chance the Court 
will not adopt such standards in determining that political powerlessness of 
a class.   
However, advocates of the movement argue that the prong can still be 
met.  Cheryl Hanna argues: 
“courts, both state and federal, have had a long history of grappling 
with questions of sex classifications and gender stereotyping.  Even 
though the issues of marriage equality or workplace rights for gay 
men and lesbians may be recent, courts are not without precedent in 
routinely striking down classifications that reinforce gender 
stereotypes” (Hanna, 2010, 1696). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein's analysis. Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste 
Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2430 (1994) (listing ‘poverty, education, political 
power, employment, susceptibility to violence and crime, [and] distribution of labor 
within the family’ as potential markers of social welfare). Moral philosopher Martha 
C. Nussbaum has subsequently propounded a useful list of ‘human capabilities’ in 
the context of thinking about women. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach 78-80 (2000). Nussbaum contends that 
there are ten human capabilities, which include (1) longevity; (2) bodily health; (3) 
bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical 
reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species (the capacity to relate to animals, plants, and 
the world of nature); (9) play; (10) control over one's environment (including 
political and material control)” (Yoshino, 2010, 1543, footnote 49). 
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Hanna’s point is that it is only a recent trend of courts actually taking LGBT civil 
rights cases and that the history of cases that were heard were predominantly ruled 
in favor of heterosexual views and stereotypes.  This type of judicial 
misrepresentation could convey the political powerlessness the LGBT movement 
has historically encountered.  Furthermore, Kari Balog argues: 
“It is true, of course, that gay persons recently have made significant 
advances in obtaining equal treatment under the law. Nonetheless, we 
conclude that, as a minority group that continues to suffer the 
enduring effects of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination, laws 
singling them out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened 
judicial scrutiny to ensure that those laws are not the product of such 
historical prejudice and stereotyping” (Balog, 2005, 547). 
 
Balog contends that just because the gay rights movement has recently grown in 
political strength, the amount of political power now may still be relatively 
powerless in regards to a ruling that could continue the discrimination and 
prejudice that homosexuals have incurred.   
 Overall, although the prong of political powerlessness brings the case of 
scrutiny for same-sex marriage into a region of ambiguity, the arguments presented 
for political powerlessness meet the requirements.   
By satisfying the four criteria of the Frontiero Test, the conclusion can be 
drawn that gays should be considered a suspect class.  However, the intrinsic 
problem with bringing the same-sex marriage argument under Equal Protection is 
that, although gays arguably meet each prong of the test, they have yet to be 
specifically or historically classified as a suspect class, which is no easy task.  If the 
Court rules in favor of same-sex marriage under Equal Protection, the Court has the 
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opportunity to consider gays a suspect class.  However, the Court has not created a 
new suspect class or quasi-suspect class since 1976 (Rush, 2008, 739).  Further, the 
Court had an opportunity in Bowers to create the suspect class of gays but refused to 
“ask the equal protection question: are gays a suspect class?” (Rush, 2008, 703).  
The Court in Lawrence had the opportunity as well, but chose to address their 
question through Due Process; “the Court chose to define the right without 
reference to the group targeted by the law and thereby avoided committing the 
Collapsible Error. This is important because the Lawrence Court avoided building an 
inequality into the analysis ab initio” (Rush, 2008, 734).  
However, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, argued for Equal 
Protection, but did not address the question of suspect classification for gays: 
“Consider that even as Justice O'Connor exposed the animosity behind 
the statute in Lawrence, she hinted that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation might be rational for the purpose of protecting the 
traditional institution of marriage. Her use of the word ‘rational’ 
implies that she would not consider sexual orientation a suspect 
classification” (Rush, 2008, 737).  
 
This proves to be the main problem with the Equal Protection argument; if the Court 
does not consider gays a suspect classification based on sexual orientation, the 
argument for same-sex marriage may not receive strict scrutiny.  
Ideally, gays will be considered a suspect class under the Equal Protection 
Clause because the “law denies a right to some, while allowing it to others” 
(Chemerinsky, 2006, 794), and the statutes against gay marriage will be considered 
discriminatory.  
If either the Due Process or Equal Protection route is used to reach strict 
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scrutiny, then the States that have such discriminatory laws must provide a 
compelling state interest as to why these laws are enforced.   
D. The States’ Compelling Interests 
Both routes of Equal Protection and Due Process trigger strict scrutiny, 
regardless of which route is chosen.  Therefore, inherent in the application of strict 
scrutiny, the States in opposition must provide a “compelling state interest” (Schaff, 
2004, 139) as to why the laws and constitutional amendments created should 
restrict same-sex marriage and no longer be presumed invalid.   
Many States argue that it is in their interest to deny same-sex marriage.  
Indiana argues for the interest of reproduction.  The State contends that same-sex 
marriage is unconstitutional in its case of Morrison v. Sadler where the court argues, 
“there is a key difference between same-sex and different-sex couples, namely, the 
ease of procreation” (Morrison v. Sadler 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005), 23).  
Indiana’s argument is for the traditional family in that the State wants couples that 
can continue to procreate, an act that is impossible for same-sex couples.  Another 
State that argues for the interest of procreation is Arizona.  In the Arizona appellate 
case of Standhardt v. Superior Court (Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451(Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2003), 458) the court states, “Implicit in Loving and predecessor opinions is 
the notion that marriage, often linked to procreation, is a union forged between one 
man and one woman.” This opinion upholds the idea that the main purpose of 
marriage is procreation, the opinion that a majority of States use as their interest.    
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However, many of these arguments cannot be upheld as compelling or much 
less reasonable.  As Strasser states, “the procreation aspect of marriage is a reason 
to recognize rather than refuse to recognize same-sex marriage, ” (Strasser, 2011, 
129).  For example, many same-sex couples are adopting children who were given 
up by their heterosexual parents.  These gay couples are still able to have families.  
However, families and adoptions are not enough for States with the mentality of 
Indiana and Arizona.  While denying marriage to same-sex couples with the 
argument of procreation, Arizona allows the elderly, pass childbearing years, to 
marry.   In addition, Arizona allows first cousins to marry as long as the cousins can 
prove they are unable to bear children, (Strasser, 2011, 130).  If Arizona’s argument 
were to be valid, marriage would have to be denied to the elderly and first cousins, 
which would continue to breach the fundamental right to marry.42  As Strasser 
argues, “The [Standhardt] court seemed to accept that the mere possibility that 
different-sex couples might have children was reason to permit them to marry, but 
that the actuality of same-sex couples having children to raise was not enough to 
justify their having the opportunity to marry” (Strasser, 2011, 130).   
Furthermore, Susan Rush argues that in denying same-sex marriage, the 
States are committing a fallacy.  She states, “The state cannot meet strict scrutiny by 
relying on a tautological rationale that defines the right by the group” (Rush, 2008, 
735).  She explains this in more detail:  
 
 
                                                        
42 Except in the case of marriage between first cousins, which some States do not permit. 
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66 
 
“For example, the state cannot argue that an anti-sodomy law is 
necessary to limit a fundamental right (sodomy) to certain people 
(heterosexuals) because the right, although ostensibly neutrally 
defined (sodomy), by definition includes only the people 
(heterosexuals) who fall within the definition of the right 
(heterosexual sodomy)” (Rush, 2008, 735).   
 
This example is in regards to the issues of the Bowers case, but can also be applied to 
same-sex marriage.  In using her language, a state cannot argue the necessity of 
limiting a fundamental right (marriage) to certain people (heterosexuals) because 
the right, although neutrally defined (marriage), by definition includes only the 
people (heterosexuals) who fall within the definition of the right (heterosexual 
marriage).  She concludes the argument with “Preserving the ‘traditional institution 
of marriage’ cannot justify limiting marriage to heterosexuals because the 
‘traditional institution of marriage’ is tautologically defined by heterosexuality” 
(Rush, 2008, 738).  
An alternative argument is that the restriction of marriage between a man 
and a woman is protected by the States’ police powers of morality.43  The police 
powers are those powers granted to the States by the 10th Amendment.  Opponents 
contend that it is immoral to have a marriage between two men or two women and 
argue that it is in the States’ rights to regulate marriage under its police powers:  
“[The] argument religious groups often put forth in defense of the 
continuing prohibition on same-sex marriage centers on the state's 
police powers. The police powers are typically classified as the right of 
                                                        
43 “Ever since Chief Justice John Marshall coined the term in Brown v. Maryland in 1827, the police power 
has been a pivot of American constitutional thinking. As recently as 1991 the Supreme Court spoke in 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre of ‘[t] he traditional police power of the States’ as one which ‘we have upheld [as] 
a basis for legislation;’ this plurality opinion of the Court defined it as ‘the authority to provide for the 
public health, safety, and morals,’” (Legarre, 2007, 745).  
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the state to regulate activity that can influence the safety, security, or 
public welfare of the community. Those who oppose same-sex 
marriage claim that it is indeed an issue of morality, which falls under 
the category of public welfare, and therefore is within the realm of the 
state to interfere” (Baker, 2010, 193).  
 
The argument for morality is seen in the Lawrence case.  Texas argued that its 
statute against homosexual sodomy was valid “by arguing that the statute satisfies 
rational basis review because it furthers the legitimate governmental interest of the 
promotion of morality” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), 582). Justice 
O’Connor states in her concurring opinion that Bowers argues, “moral disapproval is 
a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, 
but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare 
desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
US 558 (2003), 582).  Rush argues, “The [Lawrence] Court held that morality could 
not be a legitimate reason for the law, and there was no other legitimate reason, 
either” (Rush, 2008, 704).  
Therefore, the States’ compelling interest against strict scrutiny, whether 
procreation, to protect the institution of marriage, or morality under the States’ 
police powers, is not valid.  Procreation is overruled by allowing the elderly to 
marry; the argument for the institution of marriage is tautologically defeated; and 
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 E. Rational Basis 
Yet these arguments for strict scrutiny may not be adopted.  Rush argues that 
there are two exceptions to the requirement of strict scrutiny (Rush, 2008, 745).  
These exceptions do not require the statute to meet strict scrutiny because they fail 
rational basis review.  The first is the ‘ill motives’ exception where a law is 
considered ill-motivated based on some form of animus or discrimination driven by 
a society’s biased views.  Rush defines this as “Prejudice and hostility by 
government officials are illegitimate motives, but there is a difference between a 
judicial finding that a law lacks a legitimate interest and a judicial finding that a law 
is ill-motivated” (Rush, 2008, 691).  The second exception, the ‘logical’ exception is 
“when a court finds a law cannot pass rational basis review, logically, it is 
unnecessary for the court to evaluate the law under a higher level of review even 
though one theoretically applies or might apply” (Rush, 2008, 690).   If strict 
scrutiny is not assigned through the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection 
Clause, statutes against gay marriage would still be considered unconstitutional.  
The unconstitutionality is determined with rational basis through the ill motives 
exception.  
Susan Rush explains her ill motives exception to be any law or statute 
created with a prejudice.  She defines prejudice as, “a ‘preconceived opinion that is 
not based on reason or actual experience.’ Today, perhaps a synonym for ‘prejudice’ 
might be ‘stereotype,’ which means ‘a widely held but fixed and oversimplified 
image or idea of a particular type of person,’” (Rush, 2008, 704).  She continues to 
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argue, “Increasingly, the Court rejects stereotyping as a legitimate basis for 
discriminating” (Rush, 2008, 704).   
Through meeting the requirements of the Frontiero test in the chapter on 
Equal Protection, the discrimination and stereotyping against gays is addressed and 
the prejudices are apparent.44  They have been stereotyped as unable to parent, 
discriminated against at state and national levels, and overall deemed unfit for the 
institution of marriage.  As the DOMA report states, “At bottom, civil society has an 
interest in maintaining and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage 
because it has a deep and abiding interest in encouraging responsible procreation 
and child-rearing” because “At its core, it is hard to detach marriage from what may 
be called the ‘natural teleology of the body’: namely, the inescapable fact that only 
two people, not three, only a man and a woman, can beget a child” (“Defense of 
Marriage,” 1996, 13). 
 The idea of an ill-motivated law not able to pass rational basis stems from the 
years of enforcement of racist laws.  However, prejudice holds a stricter definition 
because “Racial prejudice resembled more the concept of ‘hostility,’ which means 
‘unfriendliness or opposition,’” (Rush, 2008, 705).  Rush argues, “It would be 
inaccurate and an injustice to describe racial hostility as merely a matter of 
prejudice” (Rush, 2008, 705).  Through various court cases dealing with race,45 the 
Court came to the conclusion that “the notion that prejudice, particularly racial 
hostility, is illegitimate came in to being under the only articulate standard of review 
                                                        
44 See page 48 
45 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 (1886).  
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that existed: rational basis” (Rush, 2008, 705).  The ill motives exception eventually 
broadened to include more than racist statutes, but any statute that is truly ill 
motivated (Rush, 2008, 707).   
Therefore, the problem arises with the term ‘hostility.’  There have already 
been great changes in public perceptions with the adoption of same-sex marriage.  
Polls have shifted drastically from the majority of the population condemning same-
sex marriage to condoning it.46  Therefore, if there is decreasing hostility towards 
the group, can a statute continue to be ill-motivated?  As Justice Kennedy and Justice 
O’Connor argue in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, (531 U.S. 
356 (2001)): 
“Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not from malice or 
hostile animus alone.  It may result as well from insensitivity caused 
by simple want of careful, rational reflection or from some instinctive 
mechanism to guard against people who appear to be different in 
some respects from ourselves…There can be little doubt, then, that 
persons…are confronted with prejudice which can stem from 
indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will” (Rush, 
2008, 716).  
 
Justice Kennedy is arguing that hostility towards a group is not a necessary 
condition for prejudice, or an ill motive, to be established.  He “acknowledges that 
some people harbor no ill will toward particular groups; they just do not care about 
them, or they feel insecure around them” (Rush, 2008, 717). Furthermore, “even 
though anti-discrimination laws occasionally respond favorably to a group, the 
group nevertheless can continue to be the target of discrimination” (Rush, 2008, 
                                                        
46 See page 6 
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717).   Although public opinion has taken a turn for the better concerning gays and 
same-sex marriage, the animus is still present and the ill motives behind the anti-
marriage statutes are apparent.  The only way to defeat the ill motives exception is 
“if another legitimate justification supports the law.”  As addressed in States’ 
Compelling Interests,47 there is no legitimate justification that would sufficiently 
support the anti-marriage statutes.  
Therefore, if the Court chooses not to take a strict route of scrutiny and 
rely on rational basis, statutes against same-sex marriage would continue to be 
considered unconstitutional because of the ill motivations behind the laws.  These 
statutes would not be able to pass the lowest tier of rational basis and would be 
deemed invalid.   
                                                        
47 See page 61 
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Conclusion 
 Same-sex marriage has made tremendous progress in the United States since 
the 1960’s.  LGBT awareness has grown exponentially and the number of supporters 
for gay rights, both homosexual and heterosexual, is substantial.  The growth of the 
movement spurs the intrinsic desire for equal rights for gays.  The most contentious 
right fought for today is same-sex marriage.  Same-sex marriage has advanced from 
a denial in a Minnesota Supreme Court in 1972 (Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972)) to two cases heard before the Supreme Court on March 26 and March 27 of 
2013.   
 The main precedents referenced in this thesis are Baker v. Nelson, Bowers v. 
Hardwick, Romer v. Evans, and Lawrence v. Texas.  These precedents show the 
changing attitudes towards gays and useful in understanding in order to create an 
argument for same-sex marriage.   
 The regulation of marriage is decided by the States.  Today, the majority of 
States have a form of law or amendment banning same-sex marriage.  The argument 
presented in this thesis is that the denial of the right of marriage to same-sex 
couples is unconstitutional.   
 The statutes against same-sex marriage could arguably be invalidated under 
the least restrictive rational basis test of the three levels of scrutiny.  The statutes 
meet both of Susan Rush’s exceptions to heightened scrutiny, ill-motivated and 
logical, and there is precedent of these statutes not surviving rational basis with the 
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Goodridge case.  However, this paper argued for the most restrictive form of 
scrutiny, strict, in order to provide the most protection to gays and same-sex 
marriage in the future.   
 Preventing same-sex couples to marry is an infringement of a fundamental 
right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and a violation of 
a suspect classification of people (gays) under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Both of these situations triggers strict scrutiny, the highest 
tiered level of analysis used by the Supreme Court.  However, the case for same-sex 
marriage cannot be brought on both Due Process and Equal Protection grounds, it 
must be either-or.  The right to same-sex marriage could reach the desired strict 
scrutiny by exemplifying the infringement of a fundamental right under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The right to marry is considered 
fundamental by the Supreme Court in cases such as Loving and Zablocki.  Moreover, 
the right to same-sex marriage could pass the fundamental right test established in 
Glucksberg.  However, if the Court does not recognize the infringement of marriage 
under Due Process, a suspect class of gays can be created under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Yet, this proves to be easier said than done considering a suspect 
classification has not been identified since 1976 (Rush, 2008, 739).  The thesis 
presents the argument that gays satisfy the criteria of suspect classification defined 
by Frontiero, but the Court may still disagree. 
By triggering strict scrutiny through either Due Process or Equal Protection, 
the States would have to argue why their statutes are necessary.  There are three 
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arguments presented and defeated.  The first is that the state has an interest in 
procreation of its citizens; gay people cannot procreate so there is no reason to 
allow them to marry.  This is overturned by States permitting the elderly, who can 
no longer procreate, marry.  The second argument is that the state is trying to 
protect the institution of marriage by maintaining its heterosexuality.  Susan Rush 
defeats this by calling the argument “tautological” or self-defeating.  The final 
interest the state proclaims to have is protecting morality through the 10th 
Amendment’s police powers.  This argument will most likely be beat by the Supreme 
Court based on precedent of not allowing the interest of morality to overturn the 
rights of a class of citizens.   
However, the Supreme Court may not grant strict scrutiny with either Due 
Process or Equal Protection and may rely on the less stringent test of rational basis.  
Even if rational basis is the route taken, the statutes against same-sex marriage will 
not uphold because of Susan Rush’s ill motives exception (Rush, 2008, 704).  She 
argues that if a statute is created with an ill motivation with no legitimate purpose, 
the law will not uphold the least strict test of rational basis because of the 
background of discrimination.   
The thesis argues that statutes against same-sex marriage are undeniably 
unconstitutional.  They are unconstitutional under the strictest level of Supreme 
Court scrutiny, and continue to be unconstitutional under the least strict level of 
scrutiny.  Either level of scrutiny the Court chooses to use should grant the outcome 
of legal same-sex marriage.   
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 Marriage is more than a religious union or a symbol of love.  It “promotes 
mutual lifelong caregiving in a way that no other institution does, a task that is 
important for gay and straight citizens alike” (Corvino, 2012, 20). In acknowledging 
this fact, gay couples should be permitted to marry in the United States and have 
their marriages recognized by every single state.  Denying marriage to same-sex 
couples is inherently unconstitutional per the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and should be eliminated from the laws of 
this equality-founded land.   
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